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The odyssey of Philadelphia's garbage barge demonstrates the se-
rious problem of waste disposal in the United States.' In 1986, Phil-
adelphia, like many other large cities, did not have sufficient space
to dispose of its waste. 2 Without any viable alternative, the city con-
tracted with a private company to send the trash abroad. 3 Conse-
quently, over 14,000 tons of Philadelphia incinerator ash were
loaded onto the Khian Sea, which wandered from 1986 to 1988
searching for a place to unload its cargo.4 During the eighteen
1. Porter, Outta Space! How EPA is Confronting the Nation's Mounting Garbage Crisis, 5
ENvTL. F. 11, 11 (1988); see Beck, Buried in Garbage, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 1989, at 67 (reporting
nation's garbage crisis).
2. Beck, supra note 1, at 67; see L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTLrIEB, WAt ON WASTE: CAN
AMERICA WIN ITS BATrLE WITH GARBAGE? 125 (1989) (labeling cities' garbage problem as one
of economic survival); Gilmore, The Export of Nonhazardous Waste, 19 ENvrL. L. 879, 879 (1989)
(reporting comment of Philadelphia's Deputy Street Commissioner that incident was "inevita-
ble" because of scarce landfill space).
3. 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 325, 325 (June 8, 1988). See generally L. BLUMBERG & R.
GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 4 (detailing Khian Sea episode); J. VALLErrE, THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY 11-14 (4th ed. 1989) (describing Greenpeace's
role in Khian Sea incident); NEWSDAY, RUSH TO BURN: SOLVING AMERICA'S GARBAGE CRISIS?
76-77 (1989) (discussing Khian Sea events).
Before shipping the ash abroad, Philadelphia searched unsuccessfully for a suitable disposal
site in the United States. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 4. The city felt pres-
sure to export after it was sued to remove thousands of tons of ash residue dumped near one
of the city's incinerators. Id. Following attempts to transport the ash to NewJersey and Vir-
ginia, Philadelphia turned to Ohio, where residents near the landfill formed a human fence
around the dump, effectively prohibiting disposal of the ash. Id.
4. 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 325, 325 (June 8, 1988). Two attempts were made to
unload the garbage by relabeling it, first as bulk construction material and then as fertilizer.
Gilmore, supra note 2, at 880 n.6.
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month voyage, six nations rejected the ash,5 and an environmental
group, which learned that the ash contained dangerous levels of car-
cinogens, 6 thwarted several other disposal attempts.7 The saga
ended when the cargo mysteriously disappeared.8 Currently, the
United States Department of Justice is investigating the incident. 9
Unfortunately, the Khian Sea incident is only one of several similar
incidents that exemplify the waste disposal crisis in the United
States.10 The United States generates approximately 160 million
5. 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 325, 326 (June 8, 1988). But see Beck, supra note 1, at 71
(stating that seven countries were involved in episode).
6. One attempted deal would have allowed the Khian Sea to unload some of its cargo in
Haiti. J. VALLE=, supra note 3, at 11. Haitian military leaders agreed to dump the ash on a
beach and told dock workers that the cargo was fertilizer and posed no health threat. Id.
Public outcry stopped the action once Greenpeace alerted the political opposition. Id.
7. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 4. The heavy metals and dioxins pres-
ent in incinerator ash qualify it as a dangerous substance. Id. at 110-13. The EPA, however,
has not yet determined whether to define ash as a hazardous material. Porter, supra note 1, at
13. The dangers of toxicity and potential liability, however, are deterrents to landfill owners
who are reluctant to accept the ash. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 112.
8. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 4. The Khian Sea's last owner refused to
reveal where the ash was dumped because of adverse media attention. Id. at 4-5. Court docu-
ments, however, suggest that the ship illegally dumped the ash at sea. Id. at 5; see I 1 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 325, 326 (June 8, 1988) (expressing authority's concern regarding illegal
dumping). In the hope of escaping attention, the barge changed its name twice. L. BLUMBERG
& R. GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 4.
9. Gilmore, supra note 2, at 881 n.ll.
10. Philadelphia has since received offers from other waste management corporations
promoting disposal schemes such as the use of "ash as backfill and roadbed material in the
Dominican Republic, dumping into strip mines in Chile, filling swamp lands in Honduras, and
reclaiming flood plains in Costa Rica for housing developments. None of these countries has
been alerted of the environmental concerns raised .. " Gilmore, supra note 2, at 882-83.
In 1987, the Long Island "Garbage Barge" embarked from New York, on a 162 day fiasco
loaded with 3,186 tons of solid waste. J. VALLErE, supra note 3, at 111. The barge originally
planned to unload in North Carolina, but officials there rejected the cargo. Id. After further
unsuccessful attempts to empty the waste in the United States, the barge turned to interna-
tional waters and tried to dock at foreign ports. Id. Mexican and Belgian governments, as
well as others, rejected the waste. Id. The garbage barge finally made its way back to New
York, waste still aboard, 6,000 miles and one million dollars later. Id.
Another similar incident involved Lindaco, an American company that contracted with
Guinea-Bissau to dispose annually of three million metric tons of toxic waste. Handley, Haz-
ardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International Legal Controls, 19 Em'TL. L. REP'. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,171, 10,179 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter Hazardous Waste Exports]. According to the
contract, Guinea-Bissau was to receive $120 million annually, an amount exceeding its gross
national product. Id. For further discussion of the international scope of this scheme, see
infra note 50.
The waste disposal dilemma captured the attention of the present administration, and in
March, 1989, President Bush announced his commitment to the control of hazardous waste
exports. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 11, 1989, at 21, part I. His proposal included identifying
elements to be contained in mandatory international agreements, providing the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) with greater authority to prohibit imports and exports, limiting
imports and exports to specific ports, and providing federal enforcement authority to respond
to illegal imports or exports. The Waste Export Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 2525 Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcomm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1989) [herein-
after Hearings 1] (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Administrator for
International Affairs, EPA). The Administration's version of the waste export control bill fo-
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tons of household garbage per year." Throughout the country, a
landfill space shortage has forced local governments to search for
alternative waste disposal solutions.' 2 New landfills are not built
quickly enough to meet the solid waste demand because they are
expensive' 3 and unpopular.' 4 By the year 2000, waste generation is
expected to increase by at least twenty percent.' 5
Shipping waste abroad is an attractive solution to these mounting
disposal difficulties.' 6 Depleted landfill space, coupled with the fi-
nancial benefits of exporting to countries with less costly and strin-
gent waste regulations than the United States, makes exporting
waste a logical and lucrative alternative to domestic disposal.' 7 For-
cuses on giving the EPA more control over the export of hazardous wastes. Id. To date, no
position has been taken on whether to include regulation of nonhazardous solid wastes. Id.
The waste disposal problems have also sparked international evaluation. The United Na-
tions Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), both of which include the United States as a member, have spon-
sored efforts to push environmental issues onto the agendas of world leaders and to develop
international standards for controlling the environment. Daily Reports For Executives, 116
Nations OK Limits on Waste Exports, African Countries Demand Tougher Code, Daily Rep. for Execs.
(BNA) No. 55, at A3 (Mar. 23, 1989). UNEP recently hosted the Basel Convention, a forum
addressing the problem of waste export from an international perspective. See id. (summariz-
ing Basel Convention). The OECD has also initiated legislation for the control of waste ex-
port. See 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 314 (July 8, 1987) (summarizing United States' response
to OECD proposals for waste export management). Nonetheless, the United States has
avoided a commitment to international agreements; although the United States signed the
Basel Convention, the Senate has not ratified it. See id. at 315 (explaining United States and
OECD conflict over material that should be considered hazardous); see also Daily Reports For
Executives, 116 Nations OK Limits on Waste Exports, African Countries Demand Tougher Code, Daily
Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 55, at A3 (Mar. 23, 1989) (discussing developing countries' reac-
tions to Basel Convention). At the Basel Convention, the United States opposed a proposal
that would require waste exporters to ship only to countries with environmental standards
equal to those of the exporting country, because it would effectively ban United States ex-
ports. Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 24, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
11. Porter, supra note 1, at 11.
12. Id. In 1988, the EPA estimated that at least one-third of the nation's landfills will use
up their entire capacity within the next five years. Id. The landfill space shortage is largely
due to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which forced many landfills to
close because they did not meet regulations. L. BLUMBERG & R. GO-rLIEB, supra note 2, at
125; see infra notes 66-100 and accompanying text (discussing RCRA). RCRA's land disposal
restrictions are implemented in three phases. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
§ 3004(d)-(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)-(g) (Supp. V 1987); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 268.10.12 (1989) (cat-
egorizing wastes into three groups identifying dates and waste evaluated during each phase).
The deadline for the last phase was May 8, 1990. Id. at § 268.12.
13. L. BLUMBERG & R. GO~rrEB, supra note 2, at 125-26 (noting that between 1983 and
1986 Boston realized 300 percent increase in landfill costs and Philadelphia 500% increase;
national increase was 24%).
14. Id. at 73-74. Public opposition to landfills and incinerators is termed the NIMBY-
not in my backyard-syndrome. Id. at 73. NIMBY proponents have halted the building of a
significant number of landfills and incinerators and are adept at promoting recycling and
source separation efforts. Id. at 74-75.
15. Id.
16. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOrrtEB, supra note 2, at 5 (listing export scandals).
17. The Waste Export ControlAct: Hearings on H.R. 2525 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1989)
[hereinafter Hearings 2] (statement of Rep. Howard Wolpe).
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mer United States Congressman and current New Jersey Governor
James Florio warned that waste will flow toward "safe havens"
where exporters find the least resistance and the least expense.' 8
Although these may be safe havens for exporters, the current law
governing waste exports does not ensure safe havens for the waste
itself. Instead, the hazardous qualities of waste' 9 combined with the
current disposal regulatory system has created a plethora of envi-
ronmental, 20 health,2 1 liability,22 and foreign policy 23 problems.
The present United States' waste export system under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)24 inadequately ad-
dresses the demands and the issues associated with waste export. 25
18. Porterfield & Weir, The Export of U.S. Toxic Wastes, THE NATION, Oct. 3, 1987, 325,
344.
19. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24 (1989) (listing hazardous characteristics of waste); Burk-
hart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371, 371 (1988)
(noting causal link between toxics and health problems).
20. The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 30, 1989, at 6, col. 1 (documenting death of
trees and plants resulting from toxic dump).
21. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 341. Exported materials include heavy metal
residues, chemical-contaminated wastes, pharmaceutical refuse, municipal sewage sludge, and
incinerator ash. Id. The risks involved for countries that accept the waste range from contam-
ination of groundwater and crops to birth defects and cancer. Id. Moreover, the health effects
of waste exports are not confined to national boundaries. As in the case of other environmen-
tal problems, there is persuasive evidence that the waste we attempt to push away could come
back to haunt us. Id. at 344; see Comment, U.S. Controls on International Disposal of Hazardous
Waste, 22 INT'L LAW 775, 788 (1988) (discussing hazardous waste contamination through air
and water resulting from improper waste disposal). For example, waste that is exported to
Canada is dumped near the Great Lakes. 135 CONG. REC. E1945, E1946 (daily ed. May 31,
1989). Because the United States and Canada both border the lakes, if the Canadians do not
dispose of the waste sent by American companies properly, it could leak into the lakes and
contaminate the United States water supply. Id.; see also Wash. Post,Jan. 16, 1990, at A21, col.
1 (noting that little has been done since 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement to con-
trol runoff from hazardous waste dumps). Additionally, an EPA official has warned that the
sludge sent to Caribbean nations may be used as fertilizer on vegetables, which the United
States then imports. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 344. Since the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) only examines a small portion of foods that come into the United
States, it is not a remote possibility that our exported wastes could show up on our dinner
tables. Id.
Another example of the health problems presented by indiscriminate waste export is that
on Kassa Island in Guinea, West Africa, where children play on and scavenge through
mounds of Philadelphia's incinerator ash. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 15 (testimony of Rep.
John Conyers,Jr.). The ash contains heavy metals and dioxins that can cause learning disabil-
ities, cancer, and congenital defects. Such contamination is easily transmitted to humans
through groundwater or through the atmosphere. Id.
22. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text (discussing liability provisions of
RCRA and CERCLA).
23. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 15 (testimony of Rep.John Conyers, Jr.). Congressman
Conyers commented that the United States' waste export practice is irresponsible as long as
the developing countries are considered to be America's garbage dump and that such irre-
sponsible behavior will lead to political disaster. Id.; see 135 CONG. REC. E1949 (daily ed. May
31, 1989) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.) (noting irresponsibility of implementing
NIMBY credo in foreign policy).
24. RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. V 1987).
25. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA's
PROGRAM TO CONTROL EXPORTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, REPORT OF AUDIT, No. E1D37-05-
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Although legislation covering waste export has increased in the past
ten years, weaknesses in RCRA's waste export program continue to
prevail. 26 For example, the export of nonhazardous waste, which
may be dangerous to human health and the environment if disposed
improperly, goes unregulated. 27 This practice allows municipal
sewage and some types of incinerator ash, which are categorized as
nonhazardous waste, to be transported freely across national
boundaries without the consent, or sometimes even the knowledge,
of the receiving country.28 Furthermore, only a limited consent sys-
tem exists for the export of hazardous waste under RCRA.29
Although RCRA requires that the receiving country must consent to
the import,30 the United States has no authority to nullify an agree-
ment between an exporting company and an importing country
even if the country does not have the facilities to treat, handle, and
dispose of the waste adequately and safely. 31 Moreover, RCRA does
not have any mechanism to address liability once waste is beyond
national borders.3 2
Legislators have proposed several bills that address the waste ex-
port problem. This Comment critically examines one bill, the
Waste Export Control Act (WECA),33 that purports to solve this
problem.3 4 It also examines deficiencies in the current law and pro-
0456-80855, at 3 (1988) [hereinafter AUDrr] (condemning EPA's hazardous waste export pro-
gram as inadequate).
26. Background and Summary of Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,664-65 (1986).
27. RCRA §§ 4004(a), 4005(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6944(a), 6945(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Solid waste is regulated under Subtitle D of RCRA, which only gives the EPA authority to
regulate disposal in the United States; it does not govern export. Hearings 2, supra note 17, at
47 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Administrator for International Affairs,
EPA).
28. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 53-54 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate
Administrator for International Affairs, EPA).
29. 135 CONG. REC. E1940 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (statement by Rep. Mike Synar).
30. RCRA § 3017(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
31. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,172 & n.20 (discussing United States'
lack of controls to regulate dumping outside national borders).
32. Id. at 10,174 (noting concern present notice and consent program raises for some
government officials because of prospect of international incident and liability ramifications).
33. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). H.R. 2525 was the only bill focusing on
waste export introduced in the first session of 1989 in both the House and Senate. Congress-
men Mike Synar, John Conyers, Jr., John Edward Porter and Howard Wolpe sponsored the
Waste Export Control Act that addresses the gaps in present legislation covering waste ex-
port. Id. First, the bill assumes the responsibility of protecting human health and the envi-
ronment. Id. The moral question which the Act addresses is whether the United States
should be responsible for ensuring that its hazardous waste is properly disposed of regardless
of where that disposal takes place. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 17 (testimony of Rep. John
Conyers, Jr.). Second, it recognizes the need for the United States to maintain a respectable
reputation as a trading partner.
34. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989). The Act addresses the holes in the present
waste export legislation in several ways. First, it requires that all waste exporting be con-
ducted pursuant to an international agreement with the recipient country. Id. § 12002(a).
Second, strict domestic standards are imposed to ensure that waste is managed in a manner
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poses amendments necessary to ensure the safe disposal of solid
waste. Part I presents information on waste export as well as the
current and proposed legislation which govern it. Part II analyzes
the present legislation and WECA and concludes that the current
system is ineffective. The ultimate goal should be to ban the export
of nonhazardous waste and to limit by strict controls the export of
hazardous waste. Part III proposes a monitoring system for nonhaz-
ardous and hazardous solid waste that would place liability for the
consequences of unsafe export on the exporter. The exporter is in
the best position to ensure that waste is properly disposed of in a
manner safe to humans and the environment and to shoulder the
financial burdens of any transport or disposal incidents abroad.
I. MANAGING WASTE EXPORT
A. The Problems of Solid Waste
Solid waste is classified as either nonhazardous or hazardous.
The classification depends on whether the waste displays the haz-
ardous characteristics defined by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).35 "Hazardous" and "nonhazardous" labels, how-
ever, are misleading because not all nonhazardous waste is hazard-
free.36 Furthermore, under the controlling regulations, all hazard-
ous waste generators producing less than a specified amount of haz-
ardous waste in a calendar month are exempt from regulation
despite the fact that the waste possesses hazardous characteristics. 3 7
The United States produces approximately 275 million tons of
that is protective of human health and the environment. Id. § 12002(b)(G). Third, foreign
disposal standards must be at least equal to those mandated by RCRA for the waste managed
in the United States. Id.
35. 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-.24 (1989). These wastes can either be listed by the EPA as haz-
ardous or possess one of the defined hazardous characteristics, such as ignitability, corrosiv-
ity, reactivity, and extraction procedure toxicity. Id. Waste generators are required to
determine whether their waste exhibits one of these four characteristics. Id. § 262.11. For a
more detailed description of this complex issue of classification, see Garelick, EPA's Definition
of Solid Waste: Making Distinctions Between Shades of Grey, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,349 (1987) and Gilmore, supra note 2, at 885, 888-93.
The EPA's, the EPA's delisting process adds to the confusion of classifying solid waste. 40
C.F.R. § 260.22(a) (1989). This process allows some hazardous wastes to fall under the non-
hazardous category if the waste generator proves that the waste does not warrant hazardous
treatment because of variations in processing, raw materials, or other factors. 45 Fed. Reg.
33,084, 33,116 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261). This practice increases the amount of
hazardous waste in the supposedly nonhazardous waste stream. For more information on the
delisting process, see K. Florini, A. Denison & P. Rathbun, EPA's Delisting Program for Hazardous
Wastes: Current Limitations and Future Directions, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,558,
10,588 (1989).
36. Porter, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that nonhazardous waste, such as paint and cos-
metics, contain toxic matter that obscures lines distinguishing hazardous from
nonhazardous).
37. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(a), 261.5(e)(1) (1989). Hazardous waste is not usually regulated
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hazardous waste per year.38 In 1988, the United States generated
about 160 million tons of nonhazardous waste.39 Although most
hazardous and nonhazardous waste is disposed of in this country,
significant amounts are exported abroad.40 It is difficult, however,
to determine the amount of waste actually exported. With respect
to hazardous waste, one figure, based on incomplete EPA records, 41
indicates that less than one percent of recorded hazardous waste
produced in the United States is exported.42 Determining the
amount of nonhazardous waste exported is even more speculative
because no regulations govern such movement.43 Media coverage,
similar to that involved in the Philadelphia incident, and informa-
tion provided by private groups such as Green Peace 44 are the only
means of tracking international solid waste movement. The prob-
lem, therefore, is likely to be significantly more profound than the
data may indicate.
The export process begins when local governments and waste
generators contract with private companies to send waste to foreign
countries. Canada and Mexico receive the largest shares of waste
exported from the United States. 45 International waste export
when generated in quantities of less than 100 kilograms per month. Id. Acutely hazardous
materials, however, have a lower threshold per month. Id.
38. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 46 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Ad-
ministrator for International Affairs). But see id. (statement of Rep. Gejdenson, Chairman,
Subcomm. on International Policy and Trade) (placing figure at 250 million tons); 135 CoNG.
REC. E1940 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (statement of Rep. Mike Synar) (supporting figure of
over 250 million tons); Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 341 (placing figure closer to 400
million metric tons).
39. 135 CONG. REc., E1949, E1950 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (statement of Rep. Edward
Porter). The average American generates three to four pounds of household waste every day.
Id.; see Beck, supra note 1, at 67, 69, 75 (indicating amount of waste American households
generate weekly (6.73 bags), monthly (29 bags), and yearly (350 bags)). In contrast, Western
Europe and Japan do not produce nearly this much waste because of more efficient produc-
tion processes and a greater awareness of the limits of landfill disposal space. Porterfield &
Weir, supra note 18, at 341.
40. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 142 (statement of Rep. Mike Synar).
41. The incomplete EPA records are the result of an ineffective enforcement program.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text and infra note 182 (discussing findings of Inspector
General's audit of EPA).
42. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 47 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Ad-
ministrator for International Affairs, EPA) (emphasizing that United States exports "much
less than one percent of all hazardous waste generated...").
43. Id. (acknowledging that current law provides no control over exports of nonhazard-
ous waste).
44. See supra note 7 and infra note 53 (discussing instances where Greenpeace alerted
public to waste traffic and prevented environmentally unsound dumping). Greenpeace con-
tinuously publishes pamphlets that track international waste movement, as well as provide
information on the waste policies of different countries.
45. Handley, Exports of Wastefrom the United States to Canada: The How and Why, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), 10,061, 10,061 & n.1 (1990). Approximately 80 to 90% of exported
United States waste goes to Canada and 10 to 12% goes to Mexico. Hearings 1, supra note 10,
at 169 (testimony of Francis Spivy-Weber, Dir., International Program and V. Ann Strickland,
Deputy Counsel and Dir., Toxics Program, National Audubon Society).
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agreements with these countries simplify the export disposal pro-
cess, and their proximity to the United States makes these border
countries logical waste recipients. 46 Relaxed disposal regulations
also make Great Britain another favored destination.47 Further-
more, developing countries are playing an increasingly significant
role as recipients of United States' waste.48
Waste import is a lucrative business to developing countries that
are often swayed by waste traders' assertions of financial and tech-
nological benefits.44 For example, a United States company partici-
pated in a scheme that offered the Guinea-Bissau government more
than its gross national product to permit dumping on one of its is-
lands.50 Technological benefits offered to entice developing coun-
tries to import waste include the construction of incinerators to
produce electric energy.5 1 These incinerators produce energy by
burning waste, but because developing nations are unlikely to prop-
erly regulate for safe incineration and disposal, 52 they also cause
health and environmental problems. 53
Generators of waste send it to foreign nations for numerous rea-
46. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,173.
47. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTTLIEB, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that England has become
"haven for garbage" due to "relatively lax standards").
48. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 341 (discussing "rising tide" of exports to devel-
oping countries). In 1986, the number of export notices to developing countries had in-
creased from 4 to 19. Id. These figures may not sound dramatic; it must be remembered,
however, that they do not reveal the whole story because shipments are frequently concealed.
Id.
49. 135 CoNG. REC. E1949, E1949-50 (daily ed. May 31, 1989). Waste exporters offer
developing countries the "opportunity" to recycle imported waste into salable by-products or
energy. Id. at E1950. Often these are sham recycling schemes designed to reap huge profits
that are available to those who dump waste outside the United States. Id. Toxic substances
have been misrepresented as brick-making material, roadfill, or fertilizer. Id.; see Handley,
supra note 45, at 10,064-65 (detailing illegal export schemes). Corrupt officials are targets for
exporters trying to unload their toxic wares. 135 CONG. REC. at E1949-50 (daily ed. May 31,
1989). Benefits, in addition to cash, include electricity and "land reclamation." Id. As a re-
sult, developing countries in desperate need of these commodities are persuaded to import
waste. Id.
50. J. VALLETTE, supra note 3, at 27-29 (detailing scheme between Guinea-Bissau and
United States and European waste brokers to unload 15 million metric tons of industrial waste
in exchange for potential payment of $600 million, four times Guinea-Bissau's gross national
product and two times its foreign debt). Guinea-Bissau postponed the waste import deal in
response to a negative domestic reaction. Id. at 29. They reluctantly suspended negaotiations
because, according to the trade and tourism minister, "We need money." Id.
51. See, e.g., GREENPEACE, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, at 7 (July 15, 1989) (re-
porting proposal considered by Bangladesh government committee to import millions of tons
of toxic waste from United States and Europe to fuel electricity producing incinerators), re-
printed in Hearings 2, supra note 17, at 296 (statement of Jim Vallette, Greenpeace).
52. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,171.
53. 135 CONG. REC. E1949, E1950 (daily ed. May 31, 1989). In addition to producing
electricity, these incinerators also produce toxic emissions and toxic ash. Id. Furthermore,
American exporting companies attempt to ship solid wastes such as sewage sludge, incinera-
tor ash, or household garbage to Central America and the Caribbean to fill in ecologically
vibrant, but unusable, wetlands. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 153 (testimony of Greenpeace).
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sons. First, weak or non-existent disposal standards in other coun-
tries are attractive, making disposal abroad economically
favorable.54 Exporting waste is more cost effective to waste genera-
tors than complying with the stricter domestic standards 55 imposed
by RCRA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).56 Second, limited space in
existing disposal sites pressures municipalities and states to seek
foreign receptades57 and to alleviate their garbage problems by
contracting with private companies that export waste.58 Third, Ca-
nadian disposal plants are in close geographic proximity to many
northeastern states, notably Michigan and New York, making them
easier and safer locations for waste disposal. 59 Short travelling dis-
tances provide less opportunity for accidents while transporting
hazardous substances.6 0 The same relationship exists between
southern border states and Mexico. 6' Fourth, industries are reluc-
tant to incur the short-term costs of implementing source reduction
methods such as reusing plastics and recycling paper, glass, and
metals. 62 In sum, developing countries also offer American export-
ers cheaper and less restrictive methods of disposal.63 All of these
factors contribute to a proliferation of waste export.64 Unless there
is substantial improvement in the present regulatory system under
54. 135 CONG. REc. E1940, E1940 (daily ed. May 31, 1989); see Note, Hazardous Exports to
the Third World: The Need to Abolish the Double Standard, 12 CoLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 71, 72 (1987)
[hereinafter Abolish the Double Standard] (noting that hazardous waste industry is financially
motivated to relocate to Third World countries where its activities would be subjected to little
or no regulation).
55. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,171 (estimating amount of savings at
$75.00 per ton).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
57. Auirr, supra note 25, at 11. Additionally, the EPA must decide whether it is safe to
continue land disposal of 450 hazardous wastes by 1990. Id. Should the EPA fail to meet this
deadline, the so-called "hammer clauses" go into effect, unless the EPA can demonstrate that
there is insufficient treatment capacity for handling the restricted waste. Under these circum-
stances, the EPA will have a two-year extension. Id. Since the 1970s, more than two-thirds of
the nation's landfills have closed and one-third of those left are expected to close in the next
five years. Beck, supra note 1, at 66-67.
58. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,171.
59. J. VALLETrE, supra note 3, at 95-105 (listing export notices from American companies
to Canadian disposal plants).
60. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 23 (testimony of Canadian officials).
61. J. VALLETm, supra note 3, at 106 (describing waste export policy with Mexico).
62. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,182 (noting that "industry reluctance to
incur the short term cost of (minimizing hazardous waste] is the raison d'etre of the hazardous
waste export boom").
63. Id. at 10,171 (explaining that developing countries have had "little or no" experience
with industrial waste, and consequently have few disposal controls).
64. The dramatic increase in the number of Intent to Export notices received by the
EPA's Office of International Activities (OIA) provides a clear illustration of this trend. All
companies intending to export waste to another country must file an Intent to Export notice
with the EPA. RCRA § 3017(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6398(c) (Supp. V 1987). In 1988, the EPA re-
ceived 638 notices of Intent to Export. By July of 1989, it had received an additional 588
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RCRA, waste export as a method of waste disposal is expected to
become the rule rather than the exception.
65
B. Current Law Governing Waste Export
The Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), as amended by RCRA,
governs waste export.66 RCRA is aimed at protecting human health
and the environment 67 by a system that tracks waste from, its "cra-
dle" to its "grave." 68 A manifest 69 system traces the waste from the
generator,70 through the transporters, 71 to the disposers, 72 impos-
ing on each specific requirements for the treatment, disposal, and
storage of waste. 73 Hazardous waste is regulated under subtitle C of
RCRA and is subject to stringent treatment, storage, and disposal
requirements. 74 Nonhazardous waste is regulated by subtitle D of
RCRA, but it imposes little more than open dumping restrictions for
nonhazardous waste disposal in this country. 75 In 1984, compre-
hensive amendments to RCRA, entitled the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), 76 created a section entirely
devoted to hazardous waste exports. 77 In the 1980s, the EPA intro-
notices. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 41 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Ad-
ministrator for International Affairs, EPA). In contrast, only 12 notices were filed in 1980. Id.
65. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,182.
66. Background and Summary of Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,664 (1986) (noting
that RCRA's enactment in 1976 was response to public concern over hazardous waste
disposal).
67. RCRA §§ 1003, 3002, 3003(a), 3004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902, 6922, 6923(a), 6924 (1982
& Supp. V 1987) (noting that one objective is to "promote the protection of health and the
environment," and instructing agency administrator to promulgate regulations establishing
standards that "may be necessary to protect human health and the environment").
68. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW
AND POLICY 604-613 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing RCRA).
69. RCRA § 1004(12), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). RCRA defines the
term "manifest" as the form used to identify the "quantity, composition, and the origin, rout-
ing, and destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from the point of generation
to the point of disposal, treatment, or storage." Id.
70. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1989). The EPA defines generator as "any person, by site,
whose act or process produces hazardous waste ... or whose act first causes a hazardous
waste to become subject to regulation." Id.
71. Id. The EPA defines transporter as "a person engaged in the offsite transportation of
hazardous waste by air, rail, highway, or water." Id.
72. Id. The EPA defines disposal as "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or
be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground water." Id.
73. RCRA §§ 3002, 3003, 3004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6923, 6924 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
74. RCRA §§ 3001-3019, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
75. RCRA §§ 4004(a), 4005(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6944(a), 6945(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Specifically, the statute requires that landfills must, at a minimum, contain a double-liner sys-
tem with a leachate collection and groundwater collection system. RCRA § 3004(o)(1)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 6924(o)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
76. RCRA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
77. RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. V 1987).
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duced regulations under RCRA that placed special requirements on
hazardous waste generators and transporters engaged in interna-
tional shipments. 78 In 1986, the EPA finalized regulations consis-
tent with HSWA that address the logistical details of the waste
export program.
79
The major thrust of RCRA's waste export regulations is to require
consent by the importing country.80 Specifically, RCRA mandates
that hazardous waste cannot be exported unless the EPA is properly
notified 81 and the receiving government consents in writing to ac-
cept the waste.82 The consent notice must be attached to the mani-
fest accompanying the hazardous waste shipment.8 3 At that point,
the United States forwards a description of regulations for hazard-
ous waste treatment, storage, and disposal to the receiving coun-
try.8 4 Following the receipt of consent or objection, which is
transmitted from the importing government to the EPA by the De-
partment of State, the EPA has thirty days to notify the exporter of
the receiving country's decision. 5 Exporters must file an annual re-
port cataloguing the types, quantities, frequency, and final destina-
tion of all hazardous waste exported during the previous calendar
78. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,664 (1986). The new provisions were promulgated under
separate sections of RCRA. RCRA § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1982 F. Supp. V 1987) (Stan-
dards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste) and RCRA § 3003, 42 U.S.C. § 6923
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) (Standards Applicable to Transporters of Hazardous Waste). RCRA
authorized the EPA to regulate waste management and disposal practices. RCRA § 1001, 42
U.S.C. § 6901 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
79. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,664 (1986).
80. RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. V 1987).
81. RCRA § 3017(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (Supp. V 1987). Notification must be provided
to the EPA Office of International Activities (OIA) by the primary exporter before the waste
leaves the United States and must contain "(1) the name, address, telephone number and EPA
ID number of the primary exporter"; (2) for each hazardous waste type, a description of: (i)
the waste and EPA hazardous waste number; (ii) the estimated frequency or rate and period of
time over which the waste will be exported; (iii) the estimated total quantities of hazardous
waste to be exported; (iv) all points of entry to and departure from each foreign country
through which the waste will pass; (v) a description of the means of transportation; (vi) the
manner of treatment, storage, or disposal in the receiving country; (vii) the name and site
address of the ultimate treatment, storage or disposal facility; and (viii) the name of any
transit countries through which the waste will be sent and a description of the approximate
length of stay and nature of handling while there. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(a) (1989). These provi-
sions for notice are not the original provisions of the 1984 RCRA amendment, but are revi-
sions of the EPA hazardous waste export regulations made in 1986 by the EPA to implement
RCRA section 3017, the waste export requirements of HSWA. Background and Summary of
Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,665 (1986).
82. RCRA § 3017(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (Supp. V 1987). Within 30 days of receipt of
the notice described above, the Secretary of State must: (1) forward a copy of the notification
to the receiving country's government; (2) advise the government that it must consent for the
waste to be sent; (3) request a written consent or objection; and (4) send a description of the
federal regulations for the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste in the United
States to the receiving government. Id.
83. Background and Summary of Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,664 (1989).
84. RCRA § 3017(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d)(4) (Supp. V 1987).
85. RCRA § 3017(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(e) (Supp. V 1987).
896 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:885
year.8
6
In lieu of the normal notification procedures, RCRA also permits
international agreements between the United States and receiving
countries, as long as the agreement establishes notice, export, and
enforcement procedures and sufficient transportation, treatment,
storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.87 The United States has
entered into international agreements with two countries, Canada
and Mexico.8 8 These bilateral agreements incorporate a prior con-
sent scheme similar to RCRA. 89 Unlike RCRA, however, the ex-
porter is free to ship the waste unless Canada objects to the import
within thirty days.90 In contrast, the United States-Mexico agree-
ment does not contain a provision to trigger waste export if Mexico
does not object within thirty days. 91 Furthermore, neither agree-
ment imposes compliance with any United States standard for treat-
ment, storage, and disposal, but permits Canadian or Mexican
standards to govern the import, transportation, and treatment of
waste.92 As a result of these agreements, Canada and Mexico re-
ceive approximately ninety-five percent of all recorded exported
waste.93
RCRA also prescribes several penalties to enforce waste export
regulations.94 Under RCRA section 3008(d)(6) (A),95 criminal pen-
alties are established for failure to comply with the notice and for-
eign nation consent procedures. 96 Additionally, RCRA has a special
86. RCRA § 3017(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(g) (Supp. V 1987).
87. RCRA § 3017(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (Supp. V 1987). Where there exists a prior
international agreement, the exporter must file an annual report summarizing the types,
quantities, frequency, and ultimate destination of all hazardous waste exported during the
previous calendar year. RCRA § 3017(f)-(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f)-(g) (Supp. V 1987).
88. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Canada Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28,
1986, reprinted in EPA, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS CENTER, ENFORCEMENT STRAT-
EGY HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTS app. B (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter United States-Canada
Agreement]; Annex III to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environ-
ment in the Border Area, Nov. 12, 1986, reprinted in EPA, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGA-
TIONS CENTER, ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTS app. C (Mar. 1988)
[hereinafter United States-Mexico Agreement].
89. Compare RCRA § 3017(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c)-(d) (Supp. V 1987) (requiring no-
tice and consent of export) with United States-Canada Agreement, supra note 88, at art. 3
(mandating notice and consent) and United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 88, at art. III
(requiring notice and consent).
90. United States-Canada Agreement, supra note 88, at art. 3(d).
91. United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 88.
92. United States-Canada Agreement, supra note 87, at art. 2; United States-Mexico
Agreement, supra note 88, at art. II.
93. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing distribution of waste exported to
Canada and Mexico).
94. RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
95. RCRA § 3008(d)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
96. Id. Criminal penalties are also provided for exporting hazardous waste under an
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criminal penalty provision for persons who knowingly export wastes
covered by RCRA that present an imminent danger of death or bod-
ily injury.97 Anyone who violates any portion of RCRA may incur
civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day of violation. 98 Furthermore,
the EPA may bring an imminent hazard suit on behalf of the United
States government if the handling, treatment, disposal, storage, or
transportation of any hazardous or nonhazardous waste presents an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment."99 These civil and criminal provisions, however, have no ef-
fect once the waste is transported across national boundaries.1 00
While RCRA prescribes regulations for prospective conduct, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA) provides for remedial action.101 CER-
CLA section 107102 is the federal response to the liability posed by
environmental and health dangers at toxic waste sites across the
country.10 3 The Act provides a renewable "Superfund" to finance
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.104 The liability provision is
extensive, attaching to anyone who transports or arranges for the
transportation, disposal, or treatment of hazardous wastes and to
any past or present owner of a hazardous waste disposal site. 0 5 Be-
international agreement when the exportation does not conform to the RCRA transportation,
treatment, storage, and disposal requirements for such agreements. RCRA § 3008(d)(6)(B),
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
97. RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Anyone who exhibits
an "unjustified and inexcusable disregard for human life is subject to a $250,000 fine and/or
two years in prison." RCRA § 3008(e)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(2)(A) (1982). An extreme
indifference to human life may bring a $250,000 fine and/or five years in prison. RCRA
§ 3008(e)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(2)(B) (1982). A convicted organization is subject to a
maximum fine of $1,000,000. RCRA § 3008(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(2) (1982).
98. RCRA § 3008(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6 9 28(g) (1982).
99. RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
100. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for current law's
limitation to domestic infractions).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
103. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) § 107(k)(6)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
104. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). Any person who violates CERCLA's provisions is liable to
the United States government for Hazardous Substances Response Fund, Superfund, expend-
itures. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). It is funded by a tax
imposed on specific products and from general revenues. Id. §§ 4611-12, 4661-62. The
Superfund provision is codified under the Internal Revenue Code in Title 26. For a discus-
sion of some of the issues of and problems with the Superfund, see generally F. ANDERSON, D.
MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 68, at 614-19; Comment, Compensating Hazardous
Waste Victims: RCRA Insurance Regulations and a Not So Superfund Act, 11 ENV-rL. L. 689 (1981).
105. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Any person
to which the liability provision attaches shall be liable for all removal or remedial action costs
incurred by the United States, any state, or any person as a result of a release of a hazardous
substance. Id. § 107(a)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(A)-(B). Additionally, liability will be
imposed to cover damages to natural resources and the costs of assessing natural resources
damages. Id. § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(C). CERCLA's liability provision is trig-
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cause the Act does not preclude the courts from applying joint and
several liability, one party may bear the full cost of cleaning the
site. 106
The limited defenses to CERCLA liability are consistent with
CERCLA's stringent liability provisions. The only defenses are an
act of God, war, or an intervening unforeseeable act of a third
party.10 7 Like the penal provisions of RCRA, however, CERCLA's
strong language has no effect once the waste is removed from the
United States. 10 8
Both RCRA and CERCLA are government tools to regulate and
provide remedial action for conduct effecting the environment.
Each piece of legislation, however, contains citizen suit provi-
sions' 09 that permit private citizens to institute civil actions on their
own behalf against any eligible person or any United States govern-
ment official or agency that violates a RCRA or CERCLA regula-
tion."10 These provisions also have no effect outside of the United
States. ' ' '
C. Proposed Legislation: The Waste Export Control Act
The Waste Export Control Act (WECA)112 was introduced on
May 31, 1989 in response to the burgeoning need for an effective,
comprehensive waste export program."13 The substantive provi-
sions of the Act reflect both a moral 14 and a practical concern. 115
gered if a disposed hazardous or health threatening substance is released or threatened to be
released into the environment. Id.
106. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (inter-
preting congressional intent to hold that CERCLA does not expressly state that liability may
be joint and several).
107. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
108. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for current law's
limitation to domestic infractions).
109. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659 (Supp. V 1987).
110. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); CEROLA § 310(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9659(a) (Supp. V 1987).
111. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for current law's
limitation to domestic infractions).
112. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
113. See Hearings 2, supra note 17, at 32 (statement of Rep. Howard Wolpe) (discussing
need for new legislation).
114. Congressman Wolpe, one of the bill's chief sponsors, stated "[o]ur bill is based on
the principle that we have a moral responsibility for the waste we generated from the cradle to
the grave. That responsibility does not end when our pollution goes beyond our natural
borders." Id.
115. In explaining why the United States should be responsible for its waste, Representa-
tive Wolpe said,
First, there is no better way to undermine the credibility of American foreign policy
than by the cavalier exportation of our waste. Second, the majority of our waste
trade is with our closest international neighbor, Canada. If waste we send to Canada
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WECA acknowledges the responsibility of the United States for pro-
tecting human health and the environment. 16 The bill also recog-
nizes the need of the United States to maintain a respectable
reputation as a trading partner."17
The purpose of WECA is to amend RCRA by banning exports of
solid waste, incinerator ash, and toxic waste except where bilateral
treaties 18 and export permits 19 ensure that waste will be handled
in a safe manner.' 20 The proposed amendments provide that any
is not disposed of properly, then we risk the contamination of the Great Lakes and,
thus, the health of American citizens in the entire Great Lakes region.
135 CONG. REC. E1945, E1945-46 (daily ed. May 31, 1989).
116. See Hearings 2, supra note 17, at 3 (opening statement of Rep. Gejdenson, Chairman,
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade). In support of WECA, Representa-
tive Gejdenson stated, "[w]e all live in a shrinking global environment. We can no longer
treat cavalierly the environment of foreign countries by assuming that what happens halfway
around the world has no impact on us .... Environmental problems will eventually affect
each and every one ofus." Id.; see also 135 CONG. REc. E1949 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (state-
ment of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.). Testifying in favor of passage of WECA, Representative
Conyers stated:
One of the most serious problems in the 20th century is the generation of wastes that
can spoil our waterways, taint our crops with deadly substances, and cause cancers,
birth defects, occupation diseases and environmental contamination.
mhe answer to our waste problems is not threatening the health of others by dump-
ing our waste in other countries. Rather, it is the implementation of careful controls
for disposal here, the creation of waste reduction technologies, and the enforcement
of criminal laws banning irresponsible waste disposal.
Id.
117. Hearings 2, supra note 17, at 30-32 (statement of Rep. Howard Wolpe). The sponsors
of the bill drafted the Act based on the following findings: (1) increased exports to foreign
countries; (2) the current avoidance of higher treatment and disposal expenses in the United
States by exporters is associated with the high cost of complying with environmental regula-
tions in this country; (3) the export of waste ultimately contributes to the trade deficit of the
United States; (4) the present waste export control system has a negative effect on the domes-
tic policy of source reduction; (5) the current system fails to provide any review of the effects
on waste importing countries; and (6) the uncontrolled export of wastes threatens the envi-
ronment globally. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(a)(l)-(5), 2(9)(3)-(4) (1989).
118. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12002(1) (1989). "[N]o person may directly or
indirectly, export any solid waste ... from the United States, unless . . .an international
agreement is in effect to which the United States and any country receiving the solid waste are
parties ..... Id.
119. Id. § 12003. "[N]o person may... export from the United States any solid waste...
unless he [sic] has first obtained a permit.. . ." Id.
120. 135 CONG. REC. E1949 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (statement of Rep. John Conyers,
Jr.).
Section 12002 of WECA provides:
No person may, directly or indirectly, export any solid waste to which this subtitle
applies from the United States unless- (1) an international agreement is in effect to
which the United States and any country receiving the solid waste are parties...
[and] (2) the export is made pursuant to and in accordance with that international
agreement.
H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 12002(a) (1989).
The international agreement must provide for each of the following: (1) notification of
export; (2) obtaining consent from the receiving country; (3) exchange of information on the
manner of specific treatment, storage, and disposal facilities of the receiving country, includ-
ing United States access to the facilities in the receiving country "to ensure that transporta-
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exported waste must go only to facilities that meet disposal stan-
dards equivalent to those required by the United States. 121 In addi-
tion, waste generators must make efforts to minimize waste
generation before any exports will be permitted. 12
2
Permit requirements under WECA are more stringent than those
under RCRA; for instance, WECA requires the exporter to com-
plete a detailed permit application. 123 The application requests in-
formation on the type, quantities, and concentrations of solid waste
to be exported 124 and a detailed description of the manner of trans-
portation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the waste.1 25 The per-
mit applicant must demonstrate that these processes will be
completed in a way that is protective of human health and the envi-
ronment 126 and "which is no less strict than that which would be
required by this Act if the solid waste were managed in the United
States."' 127 In addition, the application requires comprehensive in-
formation about the people involved in the import scheme, includ-
ing their ability to pay for potential damages and information on all
the people or institutions connected with the companies in-
volved.' 28 The bill also requires descriptions of the experience and
credentials of applicants, including any recorded violations of
United States' regulations relating to waste treatment during the ten
years preceding the filing of the application. 129 Additionally, infor-
mation regarding the competency, reliability, or good character of
tion, treatment, storage and disposal of solid waste will be conducted in a manner which is
protective of human health and the environment and which is no less strict than that which
would be required by this Act if the solid waste were managed in the United States;" (4)
cooperation on compliance with the enforcement of the agreement; (5) biennial review of the
effectiveness of the agreement; (6) review and revision of the agreement; (7) prohibition of
further transport from the receiving country absent written consent by the parties to the
agreement. After the expiration of the first year following passage of the Act, all bilateral
agreements must meet the Act's requirements. Id § 12002(b)(1)(A)-(G).
121. Id. § 12002(b)(1)(C). See supra note 120 for text of Act.
122. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 12003(b)(15) (1989) (requiring description of
waste minimization or elimination efforts as part of application); see also 135 CONG. REC.
E1949 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
123. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess § 12003(b) (1989).
124. Id. § 12003(b)(2).
125. Id. § 12003(b)(7).
126. Id. § 12003(b)(8). "Each application for a permit ... shall contain... [i]nformation
demonstrating that the solid waste will be transported, treated, stored, and disposed of in a
manner which is protective of human health. ." Id.
127. Id. "Each application for a permit... shall contain ... [i]nformation demonstrating
that the solid waste will be transported, treated, stored and disposed ofin a manner.., which
is no less strict than that which would be required by this Act if the solid waste were managed
in the United States." Id.
128. Id. § 12003(b)(9). This includes "public shareholders of five or more percent and
debt and equity holders." Id. § 12003(b)(10)-(l 1).
129. Id. § 12003(b)(13)-(14).
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an applicant may be required.130 Finally, exporters must provide
yearly reports addressing most of the terms in the permit.
1 31
Failure to comply with the permit procedure results in a denial or
a revocation of the permit by the EPA.132 The EPA may also refuse
permits if waste generators have failed to use all reasonable efforts
to eliminate or minimize waste generation prior to export, 33 or if
the receiving facility does not have standards at least equivalent to
those in the United States.' 3 4 To effectuate these requirements, the
EPA administrator has the authority to inspect both the facilities of
the permittee and the receiving country. 35 Moreover, the adminis-
trator may review, modify, or revoke a permit at any time during its
term. 136 Permit application fees' 3 7 and waste export permit fees de-
fray the cost of administering the Act. 138 The fees are also expected
to facilitate the enforcement of RCRA to make it a more effective
waste export program. 39
The most significant provisions in the bill are those addressing
liability. Importing countries that incur damages as a result of the
exportation of hazardous waste from the United States may bring an
action under CERCLA section 107140 "as if costs or damages were
incurred in the United States."' 4 ' Furthermore, if natural resources
within the foreign country are injured or destroyed as a result of
hazardous waste exports, the foreign government may sue to collect
compensation damages on behalf of its citizens. 142 Additionally, the
130. Id. § 12003(b)(16).
131. Id. § 12003(h).
132. Id. § 12003(d). There is also a public comment period where an informal hearing
may be held if there is opposition to the issuance of the permit. Id. § 12003(0.
133. Id. § 12003(j)(1)(A).
134. Id. § 12003(j)(1)(B). The permit may also be revoked due to "fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation in securing the permit, or in the conduct of the permitted activity" among
other considerations. Id. § 12003(j)(3).
135. Id. § 12003(k).
136. Id. § 12003(g). The Administrator of the EPA shall revoke a permit in any case in
which he determines that a waste generator has failed to make responsible efforts to eliminate
or minimize waste generation prior to export. Id. § 12003(1).
137. Id. § 12004(b)(1) (requiring fee charge to cover "all personnel, overhead and other
expenses incurred by the Administrator in processing applications and in monitoring compli-
ance with permit terms, including the cost of site inspections and any other measures neces-
sary to verify that management of exported waste complies fully with the requirements of this
section").
138. Id. § 12004(b)(2).
139. Id. § 12004(a).
140. CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); seesupra notes 102-11 and
accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's remedial provisions).
141. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12005 (1989).
142. Id. WECA provides that a "foreign government shall have the same authority and
responsibility with respect to natural resources within the foreign country as the United States
has with respect to natural resources within the United States." Id. § 12005. CERCLA pro-
vides that the United States authority and responsibility with respect to natural resources is
that, "[t]he President... shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources
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bill seeks to amend section 3008(d) of RCRA by broadening crimi-
nal liability to include the knowing export of waste in the absence of
an international agreement.1 43 These provisions strengthen the
present system for regulating waste export from the United States
and ensure safer treatment, storage, and disposal practices abroad.
II. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Current Legislation
Although RCRA and CERCLA together provide an integrated
regulatory and liability system for hazardous waste treatment, stor-
age, and disposal in this country, neither act adequately addresses
the serious ramifications attendant to sending waste abroad. The
current legal system governing waste export is deficient in two ma-
jor areas. First, RCRA does not offer liability recourse once the
waste leaves the United States. Second, there is no monitoring sys-
tem for nonhazardous waste, which, if improperly disposed, is po-
tentially dangerous to humans and the environment.
1. Liability
The EPA's imminent hazard authority under RCRA section
7003,144 the principle provision forcing cleanup of illegally disposed
nonhazardous waste, does not apply once the waste is exported
from the United States. 145 The reasons for this are two-fold. First,
RCRA does not authorize extraterritorial application of its provi-
sions. 146 Second, it is well settled that absent a clear legislative in-
tent, domestic legislation is presumably limited to domestic
application. 147 This principle results from the assumption that Con-
gress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions rather than
conditions outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 148
Similarly, CERCLA is not extraterritorially applicable; it explicitly
to recover for such damages. Sums recovered by the United States Government as trustee...
shall be retained by the trustee... for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent
of such natural resources." CERCLA § 107(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
143. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 12006(c) (1989). RCRA section 3008(d) only
provides for criminal liability in the event that an international agreement is violated. 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The maximum penalty for such a violation is to
be the same as the maximum penalty provided in RCRA section 3008(d)(6), $50,000 per day
of violation or two years imprisonment. Id.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
145. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,174 (discussing legal controls of hazard-
ous waste exports in United States and abroad).
146. Id.
147. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (holding that Eight Hour Law does
not affect work done under private contract between United States and another country be-
cause nothing in Act indicates intent to extend coverage beyond United States).
148. Id.
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states that it covers only releases into the navigable waters or terri-
tory under the jurisdiction of the United States.149 Consequently,
neither statute manifests the requisite clear intent of Congress that
permits domestic jurisdiction to reach across national bounda-
ries. 150 As a result of these limitations, foreign governments or citi-
zens of foreign countries do not have standing to invoke RCRA or
CERCLA remedies for hazardous waste disposal conducted
abroad.' 5 1 Absent statutory protection, one of the means of redress
available to foreign parties injured by the disposal of hazardous
wastes exported from the United States is that traditionally provided
by the common law tort system. 152
Plaintiffs utilize the four common law tort theories of strict liabil-
ity, nuisance, trespass, and negligence in cases involving injuries re-
sulting from improper disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous
substances. 153 They are not, however, viable remedial alternatives
for injuries sustained in foreign countries by hazardous and nonhaz-
ardous waste exports.
In order for an injured person to sustain a cause of action based
on strict liability, the plaintiff must show that harm resulted from
hazardous activities on the defendant's property. 154 The standard
149. CERCLA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
150. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,174.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see Abolish the Double Standard, supra note 54, at 82 (noting Bhopal incident gener-
ated tremendous interest in liability issue, leading some commentators to consider whether
holding United States liable as exporting country of Union Carbide is appropriate). But see
Comment, United States Controls on International Disposal of Hazardous Waste, 22 INT'L LAW. 775,
777 (1988) [hereinafter United States Controls] (noting possible extraterritorial application of
National Environmental Policy Act of 1964 (NEPA)). NEPA requires federal agencies to de-
termine and prepare a statement considering environmental impact before commencing any
major action. NEPA § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). There is language in NEPA that
alludes to extraterritorial application. NEPA § 102(F), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (1982). Specifi-
cally, NEPA section 102(F) directs all agencies of the United States government to "recognize
the worldwide ... character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the for-
eign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and pro-
grams designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a
decline in the quality of mankind's world environment." Id.
Courts have taken varying positions on whether to extend NEPA jurisdiction beyond the
United States. United States Controls, supra, at 777; see Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53,
56 (D.D.C. 1975) (enjoining United States-funded highway construction in Panama and Co-
lombia because substantive and procedural NEPA requirements were not applicable); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1347-48
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to impose environmental impact statement requirement on nuclear
export decisions when impact would fall exclusively on foreign jurisdiction).
153. Burkhart, supra note 19, at 372-77 (discussing CERCLA's four common law forbear-
ers). The common law criminal system may be an additional means of redress. Recently,
recognizing deficiencies in the tort system, states have been prosecuting corporate polluters
under the common law criminal system for environmental misconduct. See Comment, An En-
emy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REv.
311, 311 (1990) [hereinafter Enemy of the People] (discussing emerging trend).
154. See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (finding non-culpable reservoir own-
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used by the Second Restatement of Torts for strict liability is "ab-
normally dangerous activity." 155 Courts can also apply a nuisance
theory if the landowner uses his or her property in a manner that
"unreasonably interfere[s] with a right common to the general pub-
lic" (public nuisance) 156 or with another property owner's use and
enjoyment of his or her land (private nuisance). 157 Trespass actions
are rarely used because of problems of proof.1 58 An action for tres-
pass involves proving two elements: first, that pollutants have phys-
ically invaded the land;1 59 and second, that the defendant knowingly
or negligently caused the invasion.' 60 Finally, a negligence action
may be articulated if the defendant breaches a duty of reasonable
care owed to the plaintiff and, as a result, proximately causes a fore-
seeable injury to the plaintiff.16
1
Each of the above theories of recovery may be applied to the neg-
ligent operation or maintenance of inherently dangerous domestic
waste sites.' 6 2 For disposal of nonhazardous and hazardous waste
on sites located in foreign countries, however, their use is limited.
Strict liability, nuisance, and trespass require that the defendant
own the land where the dangerous activity was conducted. 63 This
is not an obstacle in situations where the waste site is owned by the
waste exporter. 164 Little recourse exists in common law nuisance,
ers liable for damage to plaintiff's property resulting from inadvertent release of reservoir
water); Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871) (applying strict liability doctrine to release of
underground water); see Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960)
(finding non-negligent excavator liable for damages resulting from explosives). The applica-
tion of the doctrine of strict liability, now recognized in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions, evolved in large part from the nineteenth century Rylands decision. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 78, at 549 (5th ed. 1984).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1979); see Department of Envtl. Protection
v. Ventron Corp., 94 NJ. 473, 482, 468 A.2d 150, 157 (1983) (holding landowner strictly
liable when toxic waste stored on his property seeped into plaintiffs' property). But see Bayley
v. Controlled Env't Corp., 127 N.H. 556, 560, 503 A.2d 823, 826 (1986) (refusing to apply
strict liability to waste dumping absent showing that requirement of proving legal fault is
practical bar to otherwise legitimate claim).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
157. Id. § 821D; see Burkhart, supra note 19, at 375; see also Biddix v. Henredon Furniture
Indus., 76 N.C. App. 30, 35, 331 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1985) (finding common law nuisance and
trespass when waste effluents and other hazardous substances were discharged into stream).
158. Burkhart, supra note 19, at 376 (noting plaintiffs' rare reliance on theory because of
proof problems).
159. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 13, at 71 (5th ed. 1984); see Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 89, 342 P.2d 790, 792 (1959) (holding projection of gases
and particulates onto another's land is trespass), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
160. Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 229 Or. 3, 6-7, 556 P.2d 175, 177 (1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1979).
161. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
162. Burkhart, supra note 19, at 372-76.
163. Id.
164. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir.)
(implying American company may be sued in tort in American court or foreign court for
injuries to foreign nationals resulting from accident in foreign country at company's gas
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trespass, and strict liability actions, however, for injured parties if
the waste is dumped on foreign territory by unknown United States
companies that do not own the site.165 In hazardous waste cases,
negligence actions are also difficult to prove and often allow defend-
ants to escape liability. 166 Commentators frequently refer to causa-
tion problems when tort actions are brought to redress
environmentally hazardous conduct. 167 In tort actions, a plaintiff
must prove that it is more likely than not that the defendant caused
the plaintiff's injury; this burden is exacerbated when the results of
the harm are delayed and only statistics indicate the link between
the defendant's actions and the harm to the plaintiff.168
The tort system may not provide the necessary remedies for
harms caused by inadequate disposal of nonhazardous and hazard-
ous waste; therefore, plaintiffs may turn to the international legal
system as an additional possible means of redress. 169 Under this
system, foreign governments may attempt to hold the United States
government liable under international law for the activities of pri-
vate parties over which it exercises control. 170 According to interna-
tional legal principles, the state's control over a private person's
activities determines the international liability a state may incur for
the acts of private parties.
17 1
Two international cases demonstrate that a state may be held re-
plant), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987); see Stoler, Inside Story of Union Carbide's India Nightmare,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,Jan. 21, 1985, at 51 (describing Bhopal incident with United States'
company).
165. See Burkhart, supra note 19, at 372-76.
166. Id. at 377; see Comment, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 576 (1983)
[hereinafter Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis] (noting that alleged victims of waste dis-
posal have difficulty recovering in tort).
167. See Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REV. 27, 29-33 (1987)
(posing problems of addressing environmental harm because of tort law: problems of identi-
fication, boundaries, and source); Jacob, Response, 24 Hous. L. REV. 58, 60-61 (1987) (re-
sponding to Professor Robert Rabin's comment, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, and
expressing belief that tort system does not adequately compensate victims of environmental
harm, especially due to causation problems); Enemy of the People, supra note 153, at 323 (argu-
ing against using tort to deter environmentally hazardous acts).
168. See Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis, supra note 166, at 583-84 (detailing
problems proving causation); Rabin, supra note 167, at 29-31 (describing time lag and source
issues); see also Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (illustrating difficulty of
identifying who caused injury when victim could not identify which hunting companion shot
him).
169. Abolish the Double Standard, supra note 54, at 82. The issue and attendant problems of
holding an exporting nation liable under international law for damages in foreign countries
has received much attention. See generally Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law
Commission's Study of "International Liability", 80 AM.J. INT'L. L. 305 (1986); Weinberg, Insights
and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 Tax. Ir'L. LJ. 307 (1985).
170. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,174 n.57.
171. Handl, State Liability for Accdental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons,
74 AM.J. INT'L L. 525, 527 (1980).
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sponsible for activities originating within its territorial jurisdiction
when the effects of such activities extend beyond that jurisdiction
and injure nationals of other states.' 72 In the Trial Smelter case be-
tween United States and Canada, an arbitral tribunal held that a
state cannot use or permit the use of its territory in a way that will
injure another's territory, property, or persons "when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and con-
vincing evidence." 173 Additionally, the Corfu Channel case between
Great Britain and Albania held that states may not knowingly permit
their territories to be used for acts which contravene the rights of
other states.' 74 These international principles point to the possibil-
ity that the United States government could be the target of a law
suit based on its control over American citizens who export hazard-
ous waste. The Trial Smelter and Corfu Channel cases involved prop-
erty ownership, and this may preclude their application when the
United States, or a United States' citizen, does not own the property
that is the genus of the damage.
Another form of redress available to foreign claimants is a cause
of action based on the EPA's failure to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty
to regulate the export of hazardous waste.' 75 Therefore, it is possi-
ble the government could incur liability for nondiscretionary acts
arising out of its regulatory programs. 176 This situation may arise,
for example, if the United States fails to abide by its obligation
under RCRA to prohibit waste exportation in the absence of the
consent of the receiving country. 177 The United States, however,
may attempt to claim sovereign immunity as an affirmative
defense. 178
172. Trial Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905,
reprinted in 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941), and Gorfu Channel (Great Britain v. Albania), 1948-
1949 I.CJ.Y.B. 57, 61 (1949). The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law recommends im-
posing state responsibility when the state of origin fails "to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for
prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or areas
beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE.AarONS LAW
OF UNITED STATES § 601 (1987).
173. Trial Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905,
reprinted in 35 AM.J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
174. Corfu Channel (Great Britain v. Albania), 1948-1949 I.C.J.Y.B. 57, 61 (1949). For a
discussion of the CorJiu Channel and Trial Smelter cases, see Abolish the Double Standard, supra note
54, at 82-83.
175. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,174.
176. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1988) (holding that discretion-
ary function exception does not preclude liability for any and all acts arising out of federal
agencies' regulatory programs but insulates from liability only those governmental actions
and decisions that involve element of judgment or choice based on public policy
considerations).
177. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,174.
178. Sovereign immunity laws of foreign countries would control whether the United
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Because its enforcement of the waste export program is weak, the
United States remains open to this type of liability. 179 The EPA has
contended that the hazardous waste export program is not an EPA
priority.180 Agency officials claim that the EPA is not able to sup-
port the waste export program because the RCRA program is se-
verely resource-constrained.' 8 ' The EPA Inspector General's audit
concluded that handling great quantities of hazardous waste contra-
vened regulations.' 8 2 Thus, the EPA's minimal enforcement efforts,
combined with limited resources, opens the door to challenges to
the government's failure to abide by RCRA.
States would be successful in escaping liability under the cloak of sovereign immunity. See 20
CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (1982) (incorporating restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity where foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity only based on its
public acts); see also J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
323-71 (3d ed. 1988) (describing history, theories, and application of sovereign immunity by
various countries).
179. AuDrr, supra note 25, at 22.
180. Id. at 23.
181. Id. The official expressed the need for support from the Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring (OECM). An OECM senior budget analyst, however, responded that
OECM's budget did not provide resources for the hazardous waste export program. Id.
182. Id. at 2. The Inspector General declared that the EPA is not equipped to regulate the
export of waste. 11 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 434, 434 (Aug. 10, 1988).
The audit highlighted several problems in the EPA's efforts to manage waste export. Au-
DIT, supra note 25, at 2. Among the major recommendations of the audit were: (1) an en-
forcement strategy to identify exporters not complying with agency regulations; (2) a joint
nationwide program with the United States Customs Service to monitor and spot check haz-
ardous waste exports in order to vigorously pursue violations; (3) procedures to ensure that
exporters provide complete descriptions of how hazardous wastes will be handled in receiving
countries; and (4) stronger procedures to alert exporters when a receiving country objects to
the export. Id
The EPA audit cited examples of how the description of the manner of handling had been
improper or inadequate in past waste export: "(1) forty metric tons of lead dross in Pakistan
was given simply as "Recycling"; (2) 120 drums of spent chemical catalyst containing mercury
sludge in South Africa was given as "Recycling"; and (3) 250 tons of lead flue dust, 250 tons
of lead furnace slag, and 11,000 tons of lead press coke in West Germany were given as
"Reclamation." Id. at 5. This audit concluded that exporters provided inadequate descrip-
tions because they were unclear about what to include in the notification. Id.
One example of the troubled program involves Mexico. Id. at 13. In 1986 Mexican envi-
ronmental authorities discovered an illegal dumping site in a rural community where a Mexi-
can recycling company had dumped 10,000 gallons of heavy hydrocarbons and other
hazardous materials that it had purchased from United States companies. Id. The Mexican
company was neither a licensed recycler nor importer, and was not authorized to dump the
material at the illegal site. Id. Subsequently, a federal grand jury returned a 41 count indict-
ment against four officers and owners of two corporations that were allegedly involved in the
illegal activity. Id. If the system had worked as it was supposed to, Mexican authorities would
not have consented to this particular import. Id.
An additional enforcement problem cited by the audit involved the yearly reporting provi-
sions of RCRA section 6939(g) which requires more specific and accurate information than
the notifications. 42 U.S.C. § 3018(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Most exporters did not comply
with this regulation, which is used in part to help determine the direction the waste export
program should take. AUDIT, supra note 25, at 24. Therefore, it was increasingly difficult for
the EPA to enforce the provisions. Id. One EPA office revised its waste export program in
response to the audit. Nevertheless, it is too soon to know if the revisions, once implemented,
will make a difference in enforcement of the program. National Enforcement Investigations
Center, Enforcement Strategy Hazardous Waste Exports, Mar. 1988.
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As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, neither RCRA, CER-
CLA, nor the tort system provide an effective net to catch exporters
once waste is removed from the country. This failure and the result-
ing difficulty in establishing liability once waste is removed from na-
tional boundaries, has created an incentive for generators to
export. 183 On the other hand, placing the liability for inadequate
waste disposal in foreign countries on the United States government
is fundamentally misdirected because it fails to address the root of
the problem. It does not place liability on the exporter who can best
assume the costs of improper transport or disposal. On the con-
trary, it allows exporters to escape the stringent United States' regu-
lations and liability provisions of RCRA and CERCLA.'8 4 In fact,
the permissiveness of the RCRA system eliminates both the incen-
tive to dispose of waste within United States' borders and the incen-
tive to reduce waste, despite the availability of the technology to do
S0.185 Therefore, more waste is produced, creating a greater need
to export.
2. Uncontrolled export of nonhazardous waste
Although RCRA requires that hazardous waste exports be moni-
tored, it does not regulate the export of nonhazardous waste.' s6
Consequently, absent media coverage or private interest group ac-
tions, there is no way to track nonhazardous waste movement. Such
imperfect coverage provides virtually no regulatory benefit and
presents several problems. Aside from the issue of liability dis-
cussed above,' 8 7 this practice poses potential dangers to human
health and the environment by permitting unregulated dumping in
foreign countries.
Despite the implementation of increasingly stringent waste export
regulation over the past ten years, the current system is inadequate
to meet the needs of growing waste traffic.188 Municipal garbage is
exported without scrutiny because the EPA's authority extends only
to domestic solid waste disposal. 8 9 Consequently, there are no reg-
183. Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 10, at 10,174-75.
184. Id. at 10,172.
185. Hearings 2, supra note 17, at 24 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
186. Id. at 28 (statement of Rep. Mike Synar); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text
(citing RCRA regulations concerning EPA's authority over nonhazardous waste).
187. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (positing potential United States'
liability).
188. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 28-29 (statement of Rep. Mike Synar) (stressing message
from Subcommittee on Environmental, Energy, and Natural Resources hearing that waste
export control program is inadequate to control growing waste export business).
189. A proposal to create a land mass in the Marshall Islands using 34 billion pounds of
United States municipal trash illustrates the dangers that exist absent export regulations for
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ulations to ensure the safe treatment, storage, and disposal of solid
waste beyond the United States' borders.
This lack of regulation is significant because nonhazardous waste
has hazardous properties.' 90 Although RCRA provides a chain of
regulatory actions and policy initiatives that are designed to segre-
gate nonhazardous and hazardous waste disposal activity, hazardous
wastes are continuously found in nonhazardous waste landfills and
incinerators.19 1 The increased costs and regulations of hazardous
waste disposal encourage the illegal disposal of hazardous waste
into nonhazardous waste receptacles.' 9 2 Additionally, about one
percent of household wastes, such as paints, pesticides, batteries,
cleaning solvents, and cosmetics include hazardous materials.'
93
Due to the landfill squeeze, this type of waste is often sent
abroad.' 9 4 Furthermore, poor enforcement of RCRA regulations al-
lows waste that should be classified as hazardous to be mislabelled
and sent abroad as nonhazardous. 195
Exposure to hazardous substances is linked to health problems
such as cancer, birth defects, and personality disorders.' 9 6 Simi-
larly, exposure to incinerator ash promotes serious health risks be-
nonhazardous waste. Id. at 16 (statement of Rep.John Conyers,Jr.). Marshall Island authori-
ties hope to increase the size of their land as a barrier to rising water levels. While this result
may be achieved, it would mean almost certain contamination of the ocean and food sources.
Id. This irresponsible action would never be tolerated in the United States, yet there is noth-
ing that enables the EPA to halt this proposal. Id.
190. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTrMIEB, supra note 2, at 88. For example, incinerator ash,
although currently treated as nonhazardous waste, poses great danger to human health and
the environment. eL- at 110. Burning trash not only concentrates toxic substances inherent in
the waste, it actually forms toxins, such as dioxin, during the incineration process. Id. Unfor-
tunately, the more efficient the air pollution control equipment, the more toxic the ash be-
comes because the toxins are concentrated in the incinerator system, rather than permitted to
escape into the air. Id.
There are two types of ash: fly and bottom. Id. Fly is a hazardous material. Therefore, to
decrease toxicity concentration, incinerator owners mix the two types of ash. Id. The mix,
however, remains toxic. Id. The toxins in the ash threaten human health by either seeping
into the ground or by escaping into the air. Id. A 1987 EPA report concluded that ash from
trash-burning plants contained significant levels of lead, cadmium, dioxin, and other toxic
substances. Id. at 111. A study conducted that same year by the Environmental Defense Fund
found that the regulatory limits defining a hazardous waste for lead and cadmium was ex-
ceeded by the averages of all samples taken at incinerator plants for the fly ash, the bottom
ash, and the combination of the two. Id.
191. Id. at 88-89.
192. Id. The rising costs of hazardous waste disposal has created a market for large-vol-
ume traffic in illegal dumping across the country. Much of this is said to be controlled by
organized crime. Id.
193. Id. This equals 55 to 60 grams per week per household of hazardous waste entering
the nonhazardous waste stream. Id.
194. See L. BLUMBERG & GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 125-26 (explaining reasons for dearth
of landfill space).
195. AUDrr, supra note 25, at 5.
196. Burkhart, supra note 19, at 371 n.1.
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cause it consistently contains heavy metals 197 and toxic organics' 98
that are toxic to humans. These toxins pose a threat to human
health by either seeping into the ground or by escaping into the
air. 199
The dangers inherent in nonhazardous waste and incinerator ash
become even more likely to cause harm when these substances are
disposed of outside the United States. Disposal is then subject to
the regulatory system of the importing country which in many cases
may consist of open dumping or may even be nonexistent.
20 0
B. Analysis of the Waste Export Control Act
Under RCRA there is no control for nonhazardous waste export,
and there is no capacity to control waste once it leaves the coun-
try. 201 The ramifications of these two problems highlight the impor-
tance of a strong, effective enforcement program to regulate waste
before and after it leaves the United States. 20 2 First, in order to ad-
dress liability concerns, RCRA and CERCLA must have interna-
tional jurisdiction. Second, nonhazardous waste export must be




One goal of WECA is to provide recourse for damages incurred
by transboundary movements of waste. 20 4 While RCRA and CER-
197. L. BLUMBERG & R. GoTrLIEB, supra note 2, at 110. The most dangerous heavy metals
are lead, nickel, cadmium, chromium-b, mercury, and arsenic. Id.
198. Id. (pointing to dioxin as example of toxic organic).
199. Id. When ash is buried in landfills, the more soluble heavy metals are likely to seep
into the groundwater. Id. Moreover, the lime used in incinerator scrubber systems increases
the alkalinity of the ash, and actually accelerates seeping caused by such natural phenomena
as erosion and runoff from rainfall. Id. at 110-1 1;see International Export of Waste: Hearing before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings 3] (statement of Rep.John Conyers,Jr.). The ash contains
heavy metals and dioxins that can cause learning disabilities, cancer, and congenital defects.
Id. Aside from the obvious dangers associated with direct contact with the ash, improperly
stored wastes may contaminate population centers through groundwater or the atmosphere.
Id.
200. Abolish the Double Standard, supra note 54, at 72-78.
201. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 343 (quoting Wendy Grieder from EPA's Office
of International Activities: "Under the Federal system, we only have control over what's in
the country .... Once it leaves, we can't do anything about it").
202. See F. ANDERSON D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 68, at 604 (explaining
theories for determining scope by RCRA).
203. 135 CONG. REC. E1940-41 (daily ed. May 31, 1989) (statement of Rep. Mike Synar)
(describing goals of WECA).
204. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 12005 (1989) (permitting national government
of foreign country in which damages are incurred to bring action under section 107 of CER-
CLA as if damages were incurred in United States).
910
1991] WASTE EXPORT CONTROL 911
CLA offer compensation and accountability measures for waste dis-
posal in the United States, there are no parallel provisions covering
the waste once it is exported.205 WECA permits the extension of
RCRA and CERCLA liability provisions to foreign countries. 206
The expansion of the jurisdiction of RCRA and CERCLA de-
pends upon two WECA amendments. First, by requiring bilateral
agreements, WECA eliminates sovereignty issues.207 Second, re-
quiring that the treatment, storage, and disposal standards of the
recipient country be equal to those of the United States should dis-
courage exporters searching for cheap and easy disposal and ensure
equitable liability coverage. 208
WECA is criticized by Canadians and other proponents of waste
export on the basis that it infringes on the sovereignty of other
countries by dictating standards for the treatment, storage, and dis-
posal of waste.20 9 The effect of the "no less strict" standard and the
inspection procedures is to impose United States' regulations and
scrutiny on recipient countries. There is, however, no infringement
of other nations' sovereignty because bilateral agreements are re-
quired by WECA.210 Consequently, the sovereignty argument pos-
ited by the Canadian government 211 and those espousing similar
205. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of RCRA and
CERCLA to domestic waste disposal). It is conceivable that the United States could be found
liable for failure to adequately regulate waste export activities as mandated by RCRA if they
result in injury to foreign countries. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (exploring
possible liability of United States).
206. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12005 (1989).
207. Id. § 12002(a)(1)-(2).
208. Id. §§ 12002, 12003(b)(8).
209. See Hearings 2, supra note 17, at 313 (statement of Ambassador D. H. Burney of Can-
ada) (calling on United States to ensure that sovereignty of receiving countries is not in-
fringed by requiring United States' standards and inspection of foreign facilities); id. at 316
(testimony of Chemical Manufacturers Association) (suggesting improvement of WECA by
respecting sovereign rights of importing countries); id. at 39-40 (statement of Dr. Frederick
Bernthal) (explaining that the "no less strict" standard places an additional and impractical
burden on countries already practicing environmentally sound management of wastes); id. at
44 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Administrator for International Affairs,
EPA) (warning that prohibiting exports, except where receiving facility strictly adheres to ex-
tensive RCRA administrative and technical requirements, intrudes too much on sovereignty
of other nations); id. at 80 (statement of Richard C. Fortuna, Executive Director, Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council) (declaring bill's goal unobjectionable, but standard and process by
which the goal is implemented self-defeating).
210. Id. at 31. (statement of Rep. Howard Wolpe) (responding to sovereignty criticism:
"It has been suggested that our bill somehow would intrude upon the sovereignty of another
. *That's frankly nonsense. Sovereignty is in no way intruded upon if a country agrees in
advance to accept the terms of an international agreement. Ifa country... is offended by the
language in a proposed agreement, it can refuse to sign that agreement. Of course, that coun-
try does not have to accept American waste products either").
211. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 312-14 (testimony from Ambassador D. H. Burney of
Canada). The greater sovereignty problem exists with Canada with whom the United States
has a bilateral treaty governing hazardous waste trade. Id. The Canada-United States Agree-
ment on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes of October 1986 was designed
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views are untenable because the recipient country is not required to
accept United States' waste.
21 2
to ensure the safe disposal of hazardous wastes by minimizing the distances wastes need to be
transported. Id. Under the treaty, waste is treated at the nearest available facility, regardless
of whether it is American or Canadian. Id. Since the Agreement was signed, Canada has
begun the process of ratifying the Basel Convention and is in the process of adopting more
stringent legal provisions to govern hazardous waste. Id. Under WECA, the bilateral agree-
ment with Canada would need to be renegotiated to ensure that waste exported from the
United States would be managed according to regulations that are "no less strict" than those
in the United States. Id. Canada claimed that such a provision effectively extends the applica-
tion of United States' law and standards into other countries and does not take into account
the responsibility of the receiving country to ensure that its own standards, enforced by its
own officials, are respected. Id.
Many other organizations, as well as the Bush Administration, have expressed the same
sentiments regarding waste export to Canada and believe the critical issue should be whether
human health and the environment are protected-not whether standards are identical. Id. at
91 (statement of Barry L. Malter, Counsel, International Environmental Policy Coalition); see
id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson, Chairman, Subcomm. on International Policy and
Trade) (suggesting that Canada should either be exempt from the "no less strict" standard or
standard should be changed to "as effective as," thereby allowing Canada to develop alterna-
tive technologies from United States).
Although other countries have objections similar to those of Canada, developing countries
interested in importing waste have an additional concern. Abolish the Double Standard, supra
note 54, at 78. Their concern focuses on a perception that the bill is another paternalistic
practice of the United States. Id. Paternalistic attitudes were evident during the hearings on
the bill, for example, "Can we honestly expect safe handling of highly toxic wastes in coun-
tries with inadequate port facilities, substandard roads, and where there may be little under-
standing of the danger of these substances?" Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of
Rep. John Conyers, Jr.). Developing countries view the waste export issae as one which in-
volves the right of a nation to determine the products it chooses to import for the use of its
citizens. Abolish the Double Standard, supra note 54, at 78. By framing the issue this way, these
countries perceive WECA as a violation of sovereign rights because it would preclude most
developing countries (those that do not have "no less strict" standards) from importing waste
from the United States. Id. In fact, one developing country accused the developed world of
'environmental imperialism" when export controls were used to protect its environment and
public health. Id. at 77. Moreover, the Act relies on the assumption of many exporting na-
tions that the importing country will have the ability to implement the regulations of a devel-
oped country by mandating equivalent treatment, storage, and disposal standards. Id. at 78.
WECA embodies an implicit judgment about the value of the environment and health, and it
imposes it on other countries that may not share the same environmental and economic val-
ues as the United States. As Congressman Synar explains, the bill "ensures that the citizen of
foreign countries will have at least equal protection that we would demand out of our own
citizens .... There is a moral question here. It sets a framework up for meeting our environ-
mental obligations .-... " Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 28.
On the other hand, many developing nations recognize the dangerous effects of uncon-
trolled waste disposal and are understandably sensitive to being treated as the garbage dump
of developed nations. As a result, many countries have regulations banning waste import.
Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 24, 1989, at A4, col. 1 (noting that approximately 40 devel-
oping nations ban hazardous waste import). Nigeria, for example, has threatened execution
by a firing squad for anyone found guilty of importing toxic waste for profit. Hazardous Waste
Exports, supra note 10, at 10,179. But see Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 24, 1989, at A4, col.
1 (mentioning point by Mostafa Tolba, executive director of UNEP, that some developing
countries may need to export waste "in the interest of sound environmental management").
212. See Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 139 (statement of Rep. Mike Synar) (rebutting asser-
tion that WECA creates extraterritorial application of United States law: "I think it was ...
the intent of the authors of this bill not to pass judgment on any other nation's laws. [The
bill) focuses on exporters and on facilities that are managing the wastes .... This is a review
of a voluntary business transaction between two companies, not two countries") (emphasis ad-
ded); see also id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson, Chairman, Subcomm. on International
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Opponents of extending the jurisdiction of RCRA and CERCLA
argue that the bill may increase illegal waste exports because it will
be more expensive and administratively difficult to send waste
abroad legally.213 This argument, however, ignores the substance
of the legislation. First, with the imposition of criminal penalties in
the amount of $250,000 for knowingly exporting hazardous waste
without a bilateral agreement, 214 the notion that exporters will be
inclined to break the law is questionable. Second, in view of the
potential liability under CERCLA, the risks of illegal export simply
become too great.215 Because liability under CERCLA is joint and
several, transporters also face potential liabilities.216 A transporter
facing enormous liabilities will be unwilling to bear the liability of
the generator and exporter, and will be forced to reveal their identi-
ties. Therefore, the new legislation makes it easier to trace the
source of illegally exported wastes. Further, allowing harmful ex-
portation of waste because of potentially inadequate enforcement
mechanisms focuses on the wrong side of the problem. Inadequate
enforcement can be improved by increased funds that would allow
for greater regulatory control. Harmful exportation, however, can
never be corrected without strong legislation.
2. Nonhazardous waste export
Another major criticism of WECA is that it effectively bans waste
export.21 7 Detractors argue that the "no less strict" standard and
the extensive application requirements will prevent the export of
any waste for at least a few years while interested nations develop
standards comparable to those of the United States.218 Although
Economic Policy and Trade) (arguing that H.R. 2525 would not tell Canada what environ-
mental laws it should enact, rather, it would tell private Canadian companies what standards
they must meet if they want to receive American waste).
213. See Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 57 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate
Administrator for International Affairs, EPA) (discussing illegal transboundary shipments of
waste). One EPA official compared the likelihood of catching illegal hazardous waste trans-
ports to stopping illegal drug trafficking. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 341.
214. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12006(c) (1989).
215. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (outlining severity of penalties); see also
Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 115 (statement of William Y. Brown, Director of Environmental
Affairs, Waste Management, Inc.) (advocating Superfund liability provision of WECA).
216. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
217. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 96 (testimony of Barry L. Malter); see also Hearings 2, supra
note 17, at 109 (testimony of Donald B. Bright, CEO, Environmental Audit, Inc.) (stating "I
do believe that H.R. 2525 in its current form is a de facto moratorium on the exporting of any
hazardous materials that would be useful for energy generation or other activities in foreign
countries").
218. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 93 (statement of Barry L. Malter). There are permit
system delays because the regulatory scheme that foreign countries would have to create, EPA
officials have advised, could easily take three to five years to fully implement. Id. at 110.
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the sponsors of the bill deny this, 219 it is inevitable that the imple-
mentation of the requirements of WECA will take a substantial
amount of time.
220
Although WECA purports that it is merely extending the regula-
tions covering hazardous waste to nonhazardous waste, 221 it effec-
tively quells the export of nonhazardous waste. For example,
WECA requires that waste generators make "reasonable efforts" to
eliminate or minimize waste generation prior to export.22
2
Although this provision is not further defined, there are other sec-
tions of the bill that support the enforcement of waste minimization.
The "no less strict" clause effectively interrupts export efforts while
other countries implement standards as strict as RCRA.223 In addi-
tion, the potential liability posed by extending RCRA and CEROLA
should encourage local governments to recycle rather than to ex-
port. 224 Waste generators will be forced to develop new strategies
for reducing waste at its source and recycling. As a result, valuable
post-consumer goods will remain in this country, thus conserving
the fossil fuel necessary to ship them abroad and saving the energy
necessary to create new products from virgin material.22 5
Elimination of the export option for waste disposal would cer-
tainly increase the cost of domestic disposal as demand increases
and capacity becomes scarce.226 The increase in demand for domes-
219. Id. at 44 (statement of Rep. Mike Synar). Representative Synar said, "This proposal
does not prohibit the export of United States wastes. Rather, the objective of the Waste Ex-
port Control Act is to correct the shortcomings of our current export control program and to
provide a framework for fulfilling our international agreements and global environmental re-
sponsibilities." Id
220. Id. at 109 (statement of Barry L. Malter). The bill states that waste exports may not
go forward without an EPA permit and that permits may not be issued until the EPA, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, has promulgated such regulations "including regula-
tions on permits, manifests, packaging, labeling, transporting, reporting, record keeping, pre-
treatment, treatment, storage, and disposal." H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12003(i)
(1989). In developing these regulations, the Administrator is required to "actively solicit
public comment .... " Id. Barry Malter testified that he had been advised by EPA officials
that the implementation of these regulations could take three to five years. Hearings 1, supra
note 10, at 110 (statement of Barry L. Malter). In the meantime, he said, "we will have trade
with Canada disrupted." Id at 93.
221. See supra notes 66-111 (comparing different regulatory standards for hazardous and
nonhazardous waste).
222. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12003(j)(1)(A) (1989).
223. Id. at § 12002(b)(C).
224. Id. at §§ 12003(b), 12005.
225. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, COMING FULL CIRCLE: SUCCESSFUl. RECYCLING To-
DAY 10-11 (1988) (revealing benefits of substituting secondary resources for virgin resources).
For example, the amount of energy required to recycle an aluminum can is only five percent
of the energy needed to produce a can from raw ore. L. BLUMBERG & R. GOITLIEB, supra note
2, at 200.
226. Eliminating the export option would require increased use of the only alternatives,
recycling and conservation. The Office of Technology Assessment reported that utilization of
current technology could eliminate as much as half of the hazardous waste generated in the
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tic disposal facilities would place an additional strain on existing re-
positories. 227 These concerns give rise to the fundamental question
of the value of exporting nonhazardous waste. In the present
United States system, few ultimately profit from waste export. The
United States loses valuable resources228 while other countries are
burdened with materials that they may not be able to dispose of ade-
quately.229 The consequence of this is injury to humans and the
environment.230
3. Enforcement
The Waste Export Control Act contains mechanisms to eliminate
the enforcement problems of the present waste export control pro-
gram. The wide scope of the permit system ensures that permit re-
cipients are in a position to deal responsibly with waste export.23 1 It
also provides a tracking and an accountability system that is cur-
rently absent under RCRA by making the requirements of the appli-
cation much more explicit.
232
An additional enforcement mechanism of the Act is the authority
vested in the EPA to halt waste export transactions. 233 Currently,
the EPA is powerless to stop even a dangerous export if the import-
United States within the next few years. 10 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 362 (July 8, 1987). The
report cautioned, however, that because of industry reluctance to reduce waste, technical
assistance on behalf of the government is necessary for the elimination of United States' gen-
erated hazardous waste. Id. The report criticized the EPA's efforts at waste reduction and
recommended that Congress establish a separate federal program within EPA to support
waste reduction. lME According to the report, four states have larger waste reduction pro-
grams than the EPA. Id.
227. See Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1989, at BI, B7, col. 1 (reporting recent "poo-poo choo-
choo" train shuttled from Baltimore to numerous Louisiana towns carrying sewage sludge
illustrating receptacle shortage).
228. Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 160 (testimony ofJim Vallette, Green Peace) (describing
adverse economic impact on the United States from exporting waste). Not only are valuable
recyclable materials lost, but "capital flows out of... the U.S." when exporters pay recipient
countries to accept the waste. MEL Therefore, the international waste trade adds to the trade
deficit. Id.
229. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (describing problems associated with
third world disposal capabilities).
230. A tragic example of the dangers in exporting hazardous materials to less regulated
markets occurred in 1971, when an American corporation exported methyl mercury to Iraq.
Abolish the Double Standard, supra note 54, at 71 n.6. Although methyl mercury is considered a
fungicide and not technically waste, its use is prohibited in the United States. Id. No such
prohibitions existed in Iraq and it was improperly used as a fungicide for wheat and barley
seeds used for baking. Id. Subsequent consumption of bread and cakes made from the con-
taminated grain killed more than 6,000 people. Id.
231. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12003 (1989).
232. IaL
233. Ia The bill reads "no person may, directly or indirectly, export from the United
States any solid waste covered by this subtitle unless he has first obtained a permit from the
Administrator ... ." Ia § 12003(a)(1). Furthermore, the Act declares that "nothing shall
preclude the Administrator from reviewing, modifying or revoking a permit at any time dur-
ing its term." Id § 12003(g).
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ing country agrees to accept the shipment. 23 4 Under WECA, this
potentially disastrous situation would be less likely to occur because
the EPA would command the authority to prevent waste transporta-
tion to countries where facilities are inadequate. 23 5
Of course, the stepped-up enforcement provisions of WECA are
accompanied by increased administrative costs. The requisite user
fees, however, defray the cost of running a waste export control pro-
gram.23 6 This relieves some of the pressures of budgetary con-
straints and allows a greater investment in the program. Given the
expected rise in the amount of waste generated and tile increased
pressure to export that is likely to follow, this provision becomes
especially important.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
WECA adequately responds to the deficiencies in the current
waste export program, and should be employed as an interim mea-
sure. The ultimate goal of legislation in this area, however, should
be a complete ban on exports of nonhazardous waste and a strictly
regulated export program for hazardous waste.
A large percentage of nonhazardous waste consists of recyclable
or reusable resources that can be used in this country.237 Rather
than retaining these post-consumer goods for American consump-
tion, under the current system they are sent abroad. A majority of
the nonhazardous waste stream is recyclable or reusable materi-
als.23 8 Because the earth's resources are finite, it is imperative that
the United States develop a waste disposal system that dispels the
234. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 18, at 343.
235. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12003(j) (1989).
236. Id. § 12004.
237. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 224, at 1 (noting that as much as 80% of
waste stream could be recycled).
238. Id. Additionally, RCRA mandates that waste reduction should be the first line of
defense against the generation of waste and its attendant problems. Hearings 1, supra note 10,
at 17 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.). More than 99%o federal and state pollution con-
trol money is allocated to cleaning up pollution after waste is generated, with less than one
percent spent on waste reduction. Id. There is also indirect but increased pressure from
Third World countries to dispose of waste in the United States because an increasing num-
bers of these countries are banning waste import. Id. at 164 (testimony of Greenpeace); see
also supra note 210 (discussing number of Third World countries banning hazardous waste
import). The following are the countries that ban waste exports as ofJune, 1989: Algeria,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Burundi, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Do-
minican Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pan-
ama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Soloman Island, Tanzania, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Vanautu, Venezuela, Western Samoa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Hearings 1, supra note 10, at 164 (testimony of Greenpeace).
The following table indicates the composition of municipal solid waste in the United States
for the years 1970 and 1984, and the projected composition for the year 2000.
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notion that natural resources can continue to be exploited reck-
lessly. A necessary step toward this goal is to stop exporting this
valuable material. Technology exists to reduce the amount of waste
generated by at least fifty percent through recycling and reuse. 23 9
The result of reducing waste would be less waste to dispose of and
less constriction on present waste receptacles. This, in turn, would
reduce pressure to export.24
0
Hazardous waste should only be exported when a bilateral agree-
Materials Discarded into the Municipal Solid Waste Stream (In Millions of Tons and
Percents):
1 70 184 2)00
Materials Tons Percent Tons Percent Tons Percent
Paper and Paperboard 36.5 33.1 49.4 37.1 65.1 41.0
Glass 12.5 11.3 12.9 9.7 12.1 7.6
Metals 13.5 12.2 12.8 9.6 14.3 9.0
Plastics 3.0 2.7 9.6 7.2 15.5 9.8
Rubber and Leather 3.0 2.7 3.3 2.5 3.8 2.4
Textiles 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.1 3.5 2.2
Wood 4.0 3.6 5.1 3.8 6.1 3.8
Other - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Food Wastes 12.7 11.5 10.8 8.1 10.8 6.8
Yard Wastes 21.0 19.0 23.8 17.9 24.4 15.3
Misc. Organics 1.8 1.6 2.4 1.8 3.1 2.0
Totals 110.3 100.0 133.0 100.0 158.8 100.0
L. BLUMBERG & R. GOTTLIEB, supra note 2, at 11.
239. See supra note 225 (discussing report by Office ofTechnology Assessment concluding
that as much as half of hazardous waste generated by United States could be eliminated); see
also ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 224, at 10 (suggesting that at least 80% of
solid waste is technically recyclable and/or compostable).
240. The benefits of recycling are numerous. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note
224, at 11. There are minor adverse environmental effects to recycling, such as transportation
of waste and waste residue. Id These costs, however, are minor compared to the harm gen-
erated by the current manufacturing and disposal processes. Id. Recycling preserves natural
resources. Id. at 10 (noting that recycling one ton of newspapers saves 17 trees). Virgin
materials are unnecessary in the manufacturing process because products are generated from
using post-consumer material. Recycling also reduces the energy used and pollution created
from manufacturing new products. Id. at 10-11.
Benefits from Substituting Secondary Resources for Virgin Resources (Percent
Reduction):
Paper Glass Steel Aluminum
Energy 23-74 4-32 47-74 90-97
Air Pollution 74 20 85 95
Water Pollution 35 - 76 97
Mining Wastes - 80 97
Water Use 58 50 40
Id at 11. In addition, recycling avoids hazardous disposal methods such as landfilling and
incinerating. Id. Furthermore, recycling creates more job opportunities than alternate dispo-
sal methods. I at 12. An estimated 36jobs are necessary to recycle 10,000 tons of material
as opposed to 6 newjobs for an equivalent amount of landfilling or 0.9 new jobs for incinera-
tion. Id. at 12-13.
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ment exists with the importing country. Such an agreement must
ensure that the importing country has the knowledge and technol-
ogy to safely treat, store, and dispose of the waste. It should also
provide liability provisions that impose liability costs on the ex-
porter through RCRA and CERCLA. Imposing the costs of clean-
ing up foreign waste disposal sites on the exporter provides a
powerful incentive to practice responsible disposal methods. Be-
cause one of the primary reasons for exporting waste is to avoid
potential liability under CERCLA, extending CERCLA liability be-
yond United States borders will force potential exporters to recon-
sider export decisions and to look for alternative and less costly
means of disposal, such as source reduction and recycling. The
Waste Export Control Act eliminates the incentive to escape RCRA
and CERCLA liability by retreating to foreign countries. 24
1
CONCLUSION
The United States is faced with a mounting waste disposal crisis.
The current waste export control program, administered pursuant
to RCRA, does not effectively control the problem because it lacks
remedial provisions and does not provide regulations for nonhaz-
ardous waste export. WECA adequately responds to these deficien-
cies and implements a comprehensive waste control program. The
bill's major contribution is in the area of liability, where it extends
CERCLA and RCRA into the international arena. In addition, the
bill addresses currently unregulated nonhazardous waste exports by
including them under the umbrella of RCRA. A more effective pro-
gram, however, would end nonhazardous waste export, strictly limit
hazardous waste export, and establish a comprehensive recycling
and reuse program.
241. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text (discussing incentives to export waste).
918
